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In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences
over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under
the assumption that agents have diversity preferences [Bredereck et al., 2019]: each agent belongs to one of the
two types (e.g., juniors and seniors, artists and engineers), and agents’ preferences over rooms depend solely
on the fraction of agents of their own type among their potential roommates. We consider various solution
concepts for this setting, such as core and exchange stability, Pareto optimality and envy-freeness. On the
negative side, we prove that envy-free, core stable or (strongly) exchange stable outcomes may fail to exist and
that the associated decision problems are NP-complete. On the positive side, we show that these problems are in
FPT with respect to the room size, which is not the case for the general stable roommate problem. Moreover, for
the classic setting with rooms of size two, we present a linear-time algorithm that computes an outcome that is
core and exchange stable as well as Pareto optimal. Many of our results for the stable roommate problem extend
to the stable marriage problem.
1 INTRODUCTION
Alice and Bob are planning their wedding. They have agreed on the gift registry and the music to be
played, but they still need to decide on the seating plan for the wedding reception. They expect 120
guests, and the reception venue has 20 tables, with each table seating 6 guests. However, this task is
far from being easy: e.g., Alice’s great-aunt does not get along with Bob’s family and prefers not
to share the table with any of them; on the contrary, Bob’s younger brother is keen to meet Alice’s
family and would be upset if he were stuck with his relatives. After spending an evening trying to
find a seating plan that would keep everyone happy, Alice and Bob are on the brink of canceling the
wedding altogether.
Bob’s friend Charlie wonders if the hapless couple may benefit from consulting the literature on
the stable roommate problem. In this problem, the goal is to find a stable assignment of 2n agents
into n rooms of size 2, where every agent has a preference relation over her possible roommates. The
most popular notion of stability in this context is core stability: no two agents should strictly prefer
each other to their current roommate. Another relevant notion is exchange stability: no two agents
should want to swap their places. However, for the stable roommate problem, neither core stable
nor exchange stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist. Further, while Irving [1985] proved that it
is possible to decide in time linear in the size of the input if an instance of the roommate problem
with strict preferences admits a core stable outcome, many other algorithmic problems for core and
exchange stability are computationally hard [Cechla´rova´ and Manlove, 2005, Ronn, 1990]. For the
s-dimensional stable roommate problem, where each room has size s and agents have preferences
over all s − 1-subsets of agents as their potential roommates, even the core non-emptiness problem
for strict preferences is NP-complete for s ≥ 3 [Huang, 2007, Ng and Hirschberg, 1991].
However, Charlie then notes that Alice and Bob’s problem has additional structure: the invitees
can be classified as bride’s family or groom’s family, and it appears that all constraints on seating
arrangements can be expressed in terms of this classification: each person only has preferences over
the ratio of groom’s relatives and bride’s relatives at her table. Thus, the problem in question is
closely related to hedonic diversity games, recently introduced by Bredereck et al. [2019]. These are
*A shortened version of this paper appears in the proceedings of IJCAI’20 and an extended abstract in the proceedings of
AAMAS’20.
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unrestricted strict dichotomous
Gu. Ex. Co. Gu. Ex. Co. Gu. Ex. Co.
Core 7 (4.1) NPc (4.2) NPh (4.2) 7 (4.1) NPc (4.2) NPh (4.2) 3 (4.4) - P (4.4)
Strong Core 7 (4.1) NPc (4.5) NPh (4.5) 7 (4.1) NPc (4.5) NPh (4.5) 7 (4.5) NPc (4.5) NPh (4.5)
Same Ex. 3 (5.1) - P (5.1) 3 (5.1) - P (5.1) 3 (5.1) - P (5.1)
Exch. 7 (5.2) ? ? 7 (5.2) ? ? ? ? ?
Strong Ex. 7 (5.2) NPc (5.3) NPh (5.3) 7 (5.2) ? ? 7 (5.2) NPc (5.3) NPh (5.3)
Pareto 3 - NPh (6.1) 3 - ? 3 - NPh (6.1)
Envy-free 7 (7.1) NPc (7.3) NPh (7.3) 7 (7.1) NPc (7.3) NPh (7.3) 7 (7.1) NPc (7.3) NPh (7.3)
Table 1. Overview of complexity results for different solution concepts and restrictions on the pref-
erence relations. For each solution concept and restriction, we indicate whether every instance
satisfying this restriction is guaranteed to admit an outcome with the respective property (Gu.), the
complexity of deciding if an instance admits such an outcome (Ex.) and of finding one if it exists
(Co.). The number in brackets is the number of the respective theorem. For all solution concepts,
the problem of verifying whether a given outcome has the desired property is in P except for Pareto
optimality, for which this problem is coNP-complete. We prove that all existence problems in this table
are in FPT with respect to the room size.
coalition formation games where agents have diversity preferences, i.e., they are partitioned into two
groups (say, red and blue), and every agent is indifferent among coalitions with the same ratio of red
and blue agents. However, positive results for hedonic diversity games are not directly applicable to
the roommate setting: in hedonic games, agents form groups of varying sizes, while the wedding
guests have to be split into groups of six.
In this paper, we investigate the multidimensional stable roommate problem (for arbitrary room
size s) with diversity preferences; we refer to the resulting problem as the roommate diversity problem.
This model captures important aspects of several real-world group formation scenarios, such as
flat-sharing, splitting students into teams for group projects, and seating arrangements at important
events. We consider common solution concepts from the literature on the stable roommate problem;
for each solution concept, we analyze the complexity of checking if a given outcome is a valid
solution, whether the set of solutions is guaranteed to be non-empty, and, if not, how hard it is to
check if an instance admits a solution as well as to compute a solution if it exists.
Our Contribution To begin with, we show that for room size two, every roommate diversity problem
admits an outcome that is core stable, exchange stable and Pareto optimal; moreover, we show that
such an outcome can be computed in linear time. For s > 2, we provide counterexamples showing
that core stable, exchange stable or envy-free outcomes may fail to exist; these negative results hold
even when agents’ preferences over type ratios are restricted to be strict and single-peaked (see
Section 2 for formal definitions). We also prove that for core stability, strong exchange stability and
envy-freeness, the existence questions are computationally hard; for Pareto optimality, we show that
it is not only hard to find a Pareto optimal outcome, but also to verify whether a given outcome is
Pareto optimal. We provide an overview of our results in Table 1.
On the positive side, we show that all existence questions we consider are in FPT with respect to
the room size. To the best of our knowledge, apart from some work on the multidimensional stable
roommate problem with cyclic preferences [Hofbauer, 2016], this is one of the first positive results
for the multidimensional stable roommate problem. Thus, the roommate diversity problem offers an
attractive combination of expressive power and computational tractability.
In the end, we also investigate the multidimensional stable marriage problem with diversity
preferences. In our model, there are s agent categories, with n agents in each category, and each agent
can be classified as red or blue irrespective of her category. An admissible outcome is a partition
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of agents into n groups, with each group having one representative from each category; the agents’
preferences over groups are governed by the fraction of red and blue agents in each group. We show
that our negative results for the roommate diversity problem extend to this model, but for the positive
results the picture is more complicated.
Related Work The stable roommate problem was proposed by Gale and Shapley [1962] and has been
studied extensively since then [Cechla´rova´, 2002, Huang, 2007, Irving, 1985, Irving and Manlove,
2002, Ronn, 1990]. It can be seen as a special case of hedonic coalition formation [Bogomolnaia and
Jackson, 2002], where agents have to split into groups (with no prior constraints on the group sizes)
and have preferences over groups that they can be part of; precisely, a stable roommate problem with
room size s is a hedonic coalition formation problem where each agent considers all coalitions of
size other than s unacceptable.
In contrast to the closely related stable marriage problem [Gale and Shapley, 1962], for the stable
roommate problem, it is not guaranteed that the core is not empty. While Irving [1985] proved
that it is possible to check in time linear in the input whether a roommate problem admits a core
stable outcome if the preferences are restricted to be strict, Ronn [1990] showed that this problem
becomes NP-complete if ties in the preference relations are allowed. As in practice a group deviation
usually requires some regrouping, Alcalde [1994] initiated the study of local stability notions that
do not require reallocating non-deviating agents, by introducing the notion of exchange stability.
Subsequently, Cechla´rova´ and Manlove [2005] proved that it is NP-complete to decide whether
an instance of the roommate problem with strict preferences admits an exchange stable outcome.
Another concept that is relevant for the roommate problem is Pareto optimality [Abraham and
Manlove, 2004, Cseh et al., 2019, Sotomayor, 2011]. Morrill [2010] proved that for room size two, it
is possible to check if a given outcome is Pareto optimal, and to find a Pareto improvement if it exists,
in time cubic in the number of agents. This implies that a Pareto optimal outcome can be found in
polynomial time. Researchers have also considered various notions of fairness in the context of the
roommate problem [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003, Aziz and Klaus, 2019]. One such notion is
envy-freeness: an outcome is said to be envy-free if no agent wants to take the place of another agent.
While much of the work on the stable roommate problem focuses on the case s = 2, there are
a few papers that consider the three-dimensional stable roommate problem [Huang, 2007, Ng and
Hirschberg, 1991]. In some of this work, the agents’ preferences are defined over individual agents
and then lifted to pairs [Huang, 2007, Iwama et al., 2007], while other authors define preferences
directly over pairs [Huang, 2007, Ng and Hirschberg, 1991]. In both models, it is NP-complete
to decide whether an instance with strict preferences admits a core stable outcome [Huang, 2007,
Iwama et al., 2007, Ng and Hirschberg, 1991]. For this reason, despite its great practical relevance,
the multidimensional version of the stable roommate problem has not attracted much attention yet.
One possibility to circumvent these negative results is to search for reasonable subclasses of the
stable roommate problem, i.e., to identify realistic restrictions on the agents’ preferences for which
the associated computational problems become tractable. This approach has been successful in
the study of the two-dimensional stable roommate problem [Abraham et al., 2007, Bartholdi III
and Trick, 1986, Bredereck et al., 2017, Chung, 2000, Cseh and Juhos, 2019], as well as in the
context of hedonic games [Aziz et al., 2019, Banerjee et al., 2001, Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002].
In particular, Bredereck et al. [2019] and Boehmer and Elkind [2020] analyzed the complexity of
finding stable outcomes in hedonic diversity games for several notions of stability, such as Nash
stability, individual stability and core stability. However, these results do not directly translate to our
model: first, with the exception of core stability, the solution concepts we consider are different from
those considered in hedonic diversity games, and second, the hard constraint on the room sizes in the
roommate problem changes both the set of feasible allocations and the set of possible deviations.
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Finally, we note that Bredereck et al. [2019] and Boehmer and Elkind [2020] related hedonic games
with diversity preferences to anonymous hedonic games [Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002], where
the agents’ preferences over coalitions only depend on coalition sizes. This connection proves useful
in our setting as well: e.g., in our hardness reductions we use the fact that it is NP-complete to decide
whether an anonymous hedonic game admits a Nash, core or individually stable outcome [Ballester,
2004].
Diversity related questions have been also previously studied in the context of stable matching
problems [Huang, 2010, Kamada and Kojima, 2015]. However, our model is fundamentally different,
as, here, agents have preferences over types and, in contrast to previous research, types are not used
to formulate distributional constraints on the outcome.
2 PRELIMINARIES
For every positive integer t , we denote the set {1, . . . , t} by [t], and we write [0, t] to denote {0} ∪ [t].
Definition 2.1. A roommate diversity problem with room size s is a quadruple G = (R,B, s,
(%i )i ∈R∪B ) with N = R ∪· B and |N | = k · s for some k ∈ N. The preference relation %i of each agent
i ∈ N is a weak order over the set D = { js : j ∈ [0, s]}.
In the following, we call all agents in R red agents and all agents in B blue agents, and write
r = |R |, b = |B | and n = |R ∪· B | . We refer to size-s subsets of N as coalitions or rooms; the quantity
k = |N |s is then the number of rooms. For each i ∈ N , let Ni = {S ⊆ N : |S | = s, i ∈ S} denote all
size-s subsets of N containing i, i.e., all possible rooms that i can be part of.
An outcome of G is a partition of all agents into k rooms pi = {C1, . . . ,Ck } such that |Ci | = s for
all i ∈ [k]. Let pi (i) denote i’s coalition in pi . Given a coalition C ⊆ N , let θ (C) denote the fraction
of red agents in C, i.e., θ (C) = |C∩R ||C | : we say that C is of fraction θ (C). A coalition C ⊆ N is called
pure if C ⊆ R or C ⊆ B and mixed otherwise.
For each agent i ∈ N , we interpret her preference relation %i over D as her preferences over
the fraction of red agents in her coalition; for instance, 25 %i
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5 means that agent i prefers a room
where two out of five agents are red to a room where three out of five agents are red.1 Thereby,
%i induces agent i’s preferences over all possible rooms she can be part of.2 Given two rooms
S,T ∈ Ni , overloading notation, we write S i T and say that i strictly prefers S to T if θ (S) %i θ (T )
and θ (T ) i θ (S). Further, we write S %i T and say that i weakly prefers S to T if θ (T ) = θ (S) or
θ (T ) %i θ (S). If i weakly prefers S to T and T to S , we write S ∼i T and say that i is indifferent
between S and T .
The preference relation of agent i is said to be single-peaked if there exists a peak pi ∈ D such that
for all α , β ∈ D such that pi ≤ α < β or β < α ≤ pi it holds that α %i β . The preference relation
of i is said to be dichotomous if it is possible to partition D into two sets D+ and D− so that for all
d ∈ D+,d ′ ∈ D− it holds that d i d ′, for all d,d ′ ∈ D− it holds that d ∼i d ′ and for all d,d ′ ∈ D+ it
holds that d ∼i d ′. We say that i approves all fractions in D+ and disapproves all fractions in D−.
Generalizing the definition of Gale and Shapley [1962], we say that a coalition S ⊆ N with
|S | = s blocks an outcome pi if for all i ∈ S it holds that θ (S) i θ (pi (i)); we say that S weakly
1We could equivalently define the agents’ preferences over the number of red agents in each room; we chose the ratio-based
definition for consistency with the hedonic diversity games literature and to emphasize the room size.
2For succinctness and consistency with prior work, we assume that each agent has preferences over the entire set D , including
0 and 1, even though a red agent cannot be part of a room with ratio 0 and a blue agent cannot be part of a room with ratio 1.
Allowing agents to have preferences over ‘impossible’ ratios has no impact on our results: even if, say, a blue agent ranks 1
highly, she cannot deviate to a coalition with this ratio. In all of our examples, the impossible ratios are ranked at the bottom
of agent’s preferences.
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blocks an outcome pi if for all i ∈ S it holds that θ (S) %i θ (pi (i)) and there exists an i ∈ S such that
θ (S) i θ (pi (i)). An outcome pi is called (strongly) core stable if no coalition (weakly) blocks it.
In an outcome pi , a pair of agents i, j ∈ N with pi (i) , pi (j) has an exchange deviation if they
would like to exchange places, i.e., θ
((pi (j) \ {j}) ∪ {i}) i θ (pi (i)) and θ ((pi (i) \ {i}) ∪ {j}) j
θ
(
pi (j)) . Further, a pair of agents i, j ∈ N with pi (i) , pi (j) has a weak exchange deviation if
θ
((pi (j) \ {j}) ∪ {i}) i θ (pi (i)) and θ ((pi (i) \ {i}) ∪ {j}) %j θ (pi (j)) . An outcome is called (strongly)
exchange stable if no pair of agents has a (weak) exchange deviation [Alcalde, 1994].
An outcome pi is called Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that makes all agents weakly
better off and some agents strictly better off, i.e., there is no outcome pi ′ such that θ (pi ′(i)) %i θ (pi (i))
for all i ∈ N and θ (pi ′(i)) i θ (pi (i)) for some i ∈ N .
An outcome pi is called envy-free if there does not exist a pair of agents i, j ∈ N with pi (i) , pi (j)
such that i envies j’s place, i.e., θ
((pi (j) \ {j}) ∪ {i}) i θ (pi (i)) .
Besides the study of the classic computational complexity of a problem, we can also investigate its
complexity as a function of a specific parameter ρ of the input; e.g., in the context of the roommate
diversity problem, this parameter could be the size of the rooms s or the size of the smaller of the two
groups min{r ,b}. We say that a problem is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to a parameter if,
given an instance I where this parameter takes value ρ, it is solvable in time f (ρ)|I |O(1), where f is
some computable function.3
3 ROOMMATE DIVERSITY PROBLEM WITH ROOM SIZE TWO
For s = 2, the roommate diversity problem becomes a special case of the classic stable roommate
problem. Our first observation is that diversity preferences make the classic problem significantly
easier: we can efficiently find an outcome that is Pareto optimal, core stable and exchange stable.
This result motivates us to focus on the case s > 2 in the remainder of the paper.
THEOREM 3.1. Every instance of the roommate diversity problem with room size two admits an
outcome that is Pareto optimal, core stable and exchange stable, which can be computed in linear
time, even if we allow for indifferences in the preferences.
PROOF. In the following, we prove the theorem by proving that every outcome returned by
Algorithm 1, which runs obviously in linear time, is guaranteed to be core stable, exchange stable and
Pareto optimal. However, we start by giving a high-level description of the algorithm. We say that a
mixed pair is happy if both agents in the pair weakly prefer a mixed pair to a pure pair. Algorithm 1
first create as many happy mixed pairs as possible. The algorithm then attempts to put the remaining
agents in pure pairs. If at this point the number of blue agents is odd, this is not possible. In this case,
depending on the preferences of agents in mixed pairs, it either inserts an additional mixed pair or
breaks up one of the mixed pairs to create two pure pairs: one red and one blue.
Core stability First of all, note that the outcome pi computed by Algorithm 1 is core stable, as
for each agent in a pure coalition it either holds that this is one of her most preferred coalitions
or all agents of the other type strictly preferring mixed coalitions are already in a mixed coalition.
Moreover, for agents in a mixed coalition it either holds that this is one of their most preferred
coalitions or all agents of the same type strictly preferring a pure coalition are already in one.
Exchange stability To prove that pi is exchange stable, we examine all agents who might have an
incentive to swap and prove that there never exists an agent willing to swap with them: an agent in
one of the coalitions from {{b∗i , r ∗i } : i ∈ [min(`,k)]} never strictly prefers swapping with another
agent, as she is already in one of her most preferred coalitions.
3For further details on the theory of parameterized complexity and the significance of FPT , the reader is referred to textbooks
by Downey and Fellows [2013] and by Niedermeier [2006].
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Algorithm 1 Computing a stable outcome in an instance of the 2-dimensional roommate diversity
problem
Require: An instance G = (R,B, 2, (i )i ∈N )
Ensure: Pareto optimal, core and exchange stable outcome pi of G
1: Let B∗ = {b∗1 , . . . ,b∗k } be the set of all blue agents b such that 12 %b 0, starting with all agents for
which this relation is strict.
2: Let R∗ = {r ∗1 , . . . , r ∗` } be the set of all red agents r such that 12 %r 1, starting with all agents for
which this relation is strict.
3: Let B
′
= {b′1, . . . ,b
′
p } = B \ {b∗1 , . . . ,b∗min{k, ` }}, R
′
= {r ′1, . . . , r
′
q} = R \ {r ∗1 , . . . , r ∗min{k, ` }},
starting with all agents who strictly prefer a pure coalition followed by all agents who are
indifferent followed by all agents who strictly prefer a mixed coalition.
4: if p mod 2 = 0 then
5: return pi = {{b∗i , r ∗i } : i ∈ [min{k, `}]} ∪ {{b
′
i ,b
′
i+1} : i ∈ {1, 3, . . . ,p − 3,p − 1}}∪
{{r ′i , r
′
i+1} : i ∈ {1, 3, . . . ,q − 3,q − 1}}
6: else
7: if 0 %b∗min{k, `}
1
2 and 1 %r ∗min{k, `}
1
2 then
8: return pi = {{b∗i , r ∗i } : i ∈ [min{k, `} − 1]} ∪ {{b
′
i ,b
′
i+1} : i ∈ {1, 3, . . . ,p − 4,p − 2}}∪
{{r ′i , r
′
i+1} : i ∈ {1, 3, . . . ,q − 4,q − 2}} ∪ {{r
′
q , r
∗
min{k, ` }}, {b
′
p ,b
∗
min{k, ` }}}
9: else
10: return pi = {{b∗i , r ∗i } : i ∈ [min{k, `}]} ∪ {{b
′
i ,b
′
i+1} : i ∈ {1, 3, . . . ,p − 4,p − 2}}∪
{{r ′i , r
′
i+1} : i ∈ {1, 3, . . . ,q − 4,q − 2}} ∪ {{r
′
q ,b
′
p }}
If {r ′q ,b′p } ∈ pi , only in the case that 1 r ′q 12 , agent r ′q strictly prefers to swap with a red agent in a
pure coalition or with a blue agent in a mixed coalition. However, as argued above, no blue agent
in one of the other mixed coalitions has an incentive to swap. Moreover, by construction, 1 r ′q 12
implies that 1 r ′ 12 for all red agents r
′
in pure coalitions. Thereby, no red agent in a pure coalition
wants to swap with r
′
q . The same holds if b
′
p has an incentive to swap.
Lastly, a red agent r in a pure coalition with 12 r 1 strictly prefers swapping with a red agent
in a mixed coalition or a blue agent in a pure coalition. However, from the fact that a red agent
with 12 r 1 is in a pure coalition it follows that all red agents in mixed coalitions also have this
preference relation. Moreover, it also follows that all blue agents who weakly prefer a mixed coalition
are already in a mixed coalition. For blue agents in pure coalitions with an incentive to swap, the
reasoning is analogous. Note that if the preferences of agents are strict, pi is also guaranteed to be
strongly exchange stable.
Pareto optimality For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists an outcome pi ′ that
weakly Pareto dominates pi . By definition, there needs to exist at least one agent i ∈ N who strictly
prefers pi ′ to pi . Consequently, i cannot be indifferent between the two realizable fractions in her
domain.
Assuming that the condition in line 4 is triggered, no agent strictly preferring a pure coalition can
be in a mixed coalition in pi . Thereby, i needs to strictly prefer a mixed coalition and needs to be part
of a pure coalition in pi . However, from this it follows that all agents of her type in mixed coalitions
also strictly prefer a mixed coalition. Consequently, pi ′ needs to include more mixed pairs than pi .
However, this cannot be achieved without making some of the agents of the other type worse off,
as all agents from the other type weakly preferring a mixed coalition are already placed in a mixed
coalition in pi .
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Assuming that the condition in line 7 is triggered, i needs to be in a pure coalition and strictly
prefers a mixed coalition. However, it is not possible that such an agent exists in this case, as this
would imply that either b∗min(k, `) or r
∗
min(k, `) also strictly prefers a mixed coalition.
Assuming that the condition in line 9 is triggered, it either holds that i strictly prefers a mixed
coalition—and the reasoning from the first case applies—or i is member of {r ′q ,b′p } and strictly
prefers a pure coalition. In the latter case, every agent of i’s type who is in a pure coalition strictly
prefers a pure coalition. Thereby, in every outcome pi ′ that weakly Pareto dominates pi , the number
of pure coalitions needs to be higher than in pi . It is only possible to increase the number of pure
coalitions by putting at least one red and one blue agent from {{b∗i , r ∗i } : i ∈ [min(`,k)]} in a pure
coalition. However, as the condition in line 7 does not hold, at least one of these agents strictly
prefers a mixed coalition and is thereby worse off in pi ′. 
4 (STRONG) CORE STABILITY
We have seen that for the roommate diversity problem with s = 2, a core stable outcome is guaranteed
to exist. However, for larger values of s this is not the case.
THEOREM 4.1. An instance of the roommate diversity problem may fail to have a core stable
outcome, even if no indifferences in the preferences are allowed.
PROOF. Let G = ({r1, r2, r3, r4}, {b1,b2,b3,b4}, 4, (%i )i ∈N ) with
r1, r2, r3 :
2
4 
4
4 
3
4 
1
4 
0
4 ; r4 :
4
4 
1
4 
2
4 
3
4 
0
4
b1,b2,b3,b4 :
1
4 
2
4 
3
4 
0
4 
4
4 .
Assume for the sake of contradiction that G has a core stable outcome pi . If pi consists of two
coalitions of fraction 24 , {r4,b1,b2,b3} is blocking. If pi consists of one coalition of fraction 34 and
one coalition of fraction 14 , {r1, r2, r3, r4} is blocking. If pi consists of a purely blue and a purely red
coalition, {r1, r2,b1,b2} is blocking. 
Further, if we assume that the room size is an unfixed part of the input, the associated existence
question becomes NP-complete.
THEOREM 4.2. It is NP-complete to decide whether a given instance of the roommate diversity
problem admits a core stable outcome. The hardness result holds even if no indifferences in the
preferences are allowed.
PROOF. To check whether an outcome is core stable, we iterate over all j ∈ [0, s] and check if
there are j red agents and s − j blue agents preferring js to the fraction of their current coalition.
To prove hardness, we reduce from the problem of deciding whether an anonymous hedonic game
admits a core stable outcome [Ballester, 2004]. Given an anonymous game with n agents, we build
an n-dimensional instance of the roommate diversity problem. The general idea of the reduction is to
map coalitions of size ` in the anonymous game to coalitions of fraction `n in the roommate diversity
problem.
Construction: Let G = (N , (i )i ∈N ) be an anonymous game. In the corresponding roommate
diversity problem, the room size s is set to |N |, and for each original agent i ∈ N , one red agent ri is
introduced. The preference relation of ri is defined by:
j
s
%ri
j ′
s
iff j %i j ′,∀j, j ′ ∈ [s].
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Additionally, for each i ∈ [s], we insert s2 blue agents:
b ji :
i
s
b ji 0,∀j ∈ [s
2].
Correctness: (⇒) Given a core stable outcome pi = {P1, . . . , Pq} of the anonymous game, we
construct a core stable outcome pi ′ of the corresponding roommate diversity problem. For each P`
with ` ∈ [q], we introduce a coalition P ′
`
consisting of the red agents corresponding to the agents in P`
together with s− |P` | blue agents of type b |P` |: P ′` = {ri : i ∈ P`}∪{b j|P` | : j ∈ [s(`−1)+1, s`− |P` |]}.
All remaining blue agents are put into pure coalitions of size s.
For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a blocking coalition S with |S | = s
in pi ′. First of all, note that at least one red agent needs to be in S . Let us assume that S includes
j red agents Sr ⊆ S . For all ri ∈ Sr , it holds that js ri θ (pi ′(ri )). However, by construction of the
preference relation of ri and the outcome pi ′, this implies that for all i ∈ {` : r` ∈ Sr } it holds that
j i θ (pi (i)). Consequently, {` : r` ∈ Sr } blocks pi which leads to a contradiction.
(⇐) To prove the other direction, let us assume that the roommate diversity problem admits a core
stable outcome pi = {P1, . . . , P`, . . . , Pk } where w.l.o.g. we assume that the first ` coalitions contain
red agents and all other coalitions are purely blue coalitions. From pi , we construct an outcome
of the anonymous game pi ′ = {P ′1, . . . , P ′`} with P ′j = {i : ri ∈ Pj } for all j ∈ [`]. For the sake of
contradiction, let us assume that there exists a blocking coalition S with |S | = j in pi ′ for some j ∈ [n].
This implies that j i |pi ′(i)| for all i ∈ S . Let S ′ = {ri : i ∈ S}. By construction, it holds that S ′ is
non-empty and that js ri θ (pi (ri )) for all ri ∈ S ′. Moreover, note that there always exists a set Sb
of s − j blue agents b with js b θ (pi (b)), as at most s ∗ (s − 1) blue agents can be part of a mixed
coalition and s2 blue agents prefer js to a pure coalition. Therefore, S
′ ∪ Sb with |S ′ ∪ Sb | = s blocks
pi which leads to a contradiction. 
Using the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can map the single-peaked anonymous
hedonic game with empty core constructed by Banerjee et al. [2001] to a single-peaked instance of
the roommate diversity problem with an empty core. We obtain the following corollary.
COROLLARY 4.3. An instance of the roommate diversity problem may fail to have a core stable
outcome, even if all agents’ preferences are single-peaked.
In contrast, if agents’ preferences are dichotomous, the core is non-empty, and an outcome in the
core can be computed efficiently: following the approach of Peters [2016], to construct a core stable
outcome we iterate over all fractions `s for ` ∈ [0, s] and add the maximum possible number of rooms
consisting of ` red agents and s − ` blue agents who all approve `s . The rest of the agents are split
into the remaining rooms. We obtain the following result.
THEOREM 4.4. Every instance of the roommate diversity problem with dichotomous preferences
admits a core stable outcome; moreover, an outcome in the core can be computed in polynomial time.
However, this positive result does not extend to the more demanding notion of strong core stability.
THEOREM 4.5. It is NP-complete to decide whether a given roommate diversity problem admits
a strongly core stable outcome, even if the preferences are restricted to be dichotomous and every
agent approves at most four fractions.
PROOF. Peters [2016] showed that the corresponding problem for anonymous hedonic games is
NP-complete. By reducing from this problem, we can establish that our problem is NP-hard as well;
the reduction is similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
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5 (STRONG) EXCHANGE STABILITY
As pointed out in the introduction, it is not always plausible to assume that agents are allowed to
perform group deviations. Therefore, in this section we focus on stability concepts that are defined in
terms of agent swaps.
5.1 Same-Type Swaps
If the set of possible deviations is limited to agent swaps, it may be the case that only agents of the
same type are allowed to swap their places: we call the resulting stability notion same-type-exchange
stability. For example, if a professor forms fixed-size teams for a group project, she may want to
fix the fraction of graduate students in each group (e.g., to ensure that the experienced students are
equally distributed) but still allow for swaps between two undergraduate students or between two
graduate students. Under this weaker version of exchange stability, the agents are guaranteed to
eventually converge to a stable outcome.
THEOREM 5.1. Every instance of the roommate diversity problem has a (strongly) same-type-
exchange stable outcome, and some such outcome can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. To compute a (strongly) same-type-exchange stable outcome, we start at an arbitrary
outcome pi and swap pairs who have a (weak) same-type-exchange deviation until this is no longer
possible. To see that this procedure always terminates, note that same-type exchange deviations do
not change the fraction of red agents in any coalition. Thereby, nothing changes for agents who are
not involved in the swap, while both agents involved in the swap weakly improve and at least one of
them strictly improves. As every agent’s preference relation is defined over s + 1 elements, the total
number of swaps is at most ns. 
5.2 Unrestricted Swaps
Unfortunately, the existence guarantee for same-type swaps does not extend to unrestricted swaps.
THEOREM 5.2. An instance of the roommate diversity problem may fail to have an exchange
stable outcome, even if the preferences are single-peaked and no indifferences in the preferences are
allowed.
PROOF. The following single-peaked roommate diversity game G = ({r1, r2, r3, r4, r5},
{b1,b2,b3,b4}, 3, (%i )i ∈N ) with:
r1, r2 :
3
3 
2
3 
1
3 
0
3 ; r3, r4, r5 :
2
3 
1
3 
3
3 
0
3 ;
b1 :
0
3 
1
3 
2
3 
3
3 ; b2,b3,b4 :
1
3 
2
3 
0
3 
3
3 .
does not admit an exchange-stable outcome.
We will first argue that there is no exchange stable outcome containing a purely red coalition S .
Indeed, if such an outcome exists, either (i) both of the remaining red agents are in the same coalition,
or (ii) the remaining red agents are in two different coalitions.
In case (i), there also exists a purely blue coalition, which we denote by T . At least one of r3, r4
and r5 has to be in S , and at least one of b2,b3 and b4 has to be in T ; thus, at least one agent in S and
at least one agent in T would like to swap places.
In case (ii), as b1 strictly prefers 0 to 13 , she would like to swap with the red agent in the other
mixed coalition. As all red agents prefer 23 to
1
3 , this red agent would be happy to swap with b1, too.
It remains to argue that there is no exchange stable outcome with no purely red coalition. In
this case, there exist two mixed coalitions of fraction 23 and one mixed coalition of fraction
1
3 .
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Consequently, at least one of r1 and r2 belongs to a coalition of fraction 23 ; this agent would like
to swap with the blue agent in the other mixed coalition of fraction 23 . As all blue agents prefer
1
3
to 23 , this blue agent would be happy with the swap as well, so no such outcome can be exchange
stable. 
Further, the associated existence problem for strong exchange stability is NP-complete.
THEOREM 5.3. It is NP-complete to decide whether a given instance of the roommate diversity
problem admits a strongly exchange stable outcome. The hardness result still holds if the preferences
are dichotomous and every agent approves at most four fractions.
PROOF. To show membership, note that it is possible to verify in polynomial time whether an
outcome is strongly exchange stable by iterating over all pairs of agents and checking whether they
have a weak exchange-deviation.
To show hardness, we reduce from the problem of deciding whether an anonymous hedonic game
admits a Nash stable outcome [Ballester, 2004]; recall that an outcome of a hedonic game is said to
be Nash stable if no agent wants to move from her current coalition to another existing coalition or to
form a singleton coalition. Our reduction is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 4.2; however,
here, we introduce n2 − n blue agents who are indifferent among all fractions. Thereby, each time
an agent has a Nash deviation in the anonymous game, the corresponding red agent has a weak
exchange-deviation with a blue agent in the corresponding outcome of the constructed roommate
diversity problem and the other way round.
Construction: Given an anonymous gameG = (N , (i )i ∈N ), the room size s in the corresponding
roommate diversity problem is set to |N |. Moreover, for each agent i ∈ N , a red agent ri is introduced
whose preference relation is defined by:
j
s
%ri
j ′
s
iff j %i j ′,∀j, j ′ ∈ [s].
Further, for all i ∈ [s2 − s], a blue agent bi who is indifferent among all fractions is introduced.
Correctness: (⇒)We start by assuming that G admits a Nash stable outcome pi = {P1, . . . , Pq}.
From pi , we construct a strongly exchange stable outcome of the corresponding roommate diversity
problem. First of all, for all ` ∈ [q], we insert one coalition P ′
`
consisting of all red agents
corresponding to the agents in P` and s − |P` | blue agents into pi ′: P ′` = {ri : i ∈ P`} ∪ {bi : i ∈[s(` − 1) + 1, s` − |P` |]}. The remaining blue agents are put into pure coalitions of size s. pi ′ is
not guaranteed to be strongly exchange stable, as there might exist a pair of red agents with an
exchange-deviation. However, as pi is Nash stable, for all i ∈ [n] it holds that:
θ (pi ′(ri )) %ri
1
s
and ∀j ∈ [q] \ {pi ′(ri )} : θ (pi ′(ri )) %ri
|Pj | + 1
s
.
To construct a strongly exchange stable outcome from pi ′, we execute weak same-type-exchange-
deviations as long as there exists a pair with a weak same-type-exchange-deviation to obtain an
outcome pi ′′.4 It remains to show that no two agents of a different type have a weak exchange-
deviation in pi ′′: recall that by performing weak same-type-exchange-deviations every agent’s
situation can only be improved. Consequently, in pi ′′, it holds for all i ∈ [n] that: θ (pi ′′(ri )) %ri
θ (pi ′(ri )). Applying this to the equation from above, it follows that no red agent has an incentive to
swap with a blue agent in pi ′′. Consequently, pi ′′ is strongly exchange stable.
(⇐) To prove the other direction, let us assume that the roommate diversity problem admits a
strongly exchange stable outcome pi = {P1, . . . , P`, . . . , Pk } where w.l.o.g. the first ` coalitions
4As discussed in Theorem 5.1, this process is always guaranteed to terminate.
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contain red agents, while the remaining coalitions are purely blue coalitions. Let pi ′ = {P ′1, . . . , P
′
`
}
with P
′
j = {i : ri ∈ Pj } for all j ∈ [`] be an outcome of the anonymous game. To prove that pi ′ is Nash
stable, note that in pi , for all i ∈ N , there always exists at least one blue agent in every coalition r is
not part of. As pi is strongly exchange stable, from this and the fact that each blue agent is indifferent
among all coalitions it follows that for all i ∈ [n] it holds that:
θ (pi (ri )) %ri
1
s
and ∀j ∈ [`] \ {pi (ri )} : θ (pi (ri )) %ri
|P ′j | + 1
s
.
By construction, from this it follows that for all i ∈ [n] it holds that:
θ (pi ′(i)) %i 1 and ∀j ∈ [`] \ {pi ′(i)} : θ (pi ′(i)) %i |P ′j | + 1,
which implies that pi ′ is Nash stable.
It is also possible to show that the proven NP-hardness result still holds if the agents’ preferences
are dichotomous and every agent approves at most four fractions by reducing from the related
problem for anonymous games, which is NP-complete as proven by Peters [2016]. The construction
of the reduction needs to be slightly adapted: for all red agents, the set of approved fractions is
the transformed set of the corresponding agent in the anonymous game, and all blue agents do not
approve any fraction. 
We believe that deciding whether a roommate diversity problem admits an exchange stable
outcome is NP-complete as well, but we were unable to extend the proof of Theorem 5.3 to show
this.
6 PARETO OPTIMALITY
In the roommate problem, Pareto optimality emerges as a natural notion of stability. Indeed, an
outcome is not Pareto optimal if and only if we can rearrange the agents so that all of them are
weakly better off and at least some of them are strictly better off, i.e., there is a weakly improving
deviation by the grand coalition [Elkind et al., 2016, Morrill, 2010].
While for many other stability concepts we consider stable outcomes are not guaranteed to exist,
by the definition of Pareto optimality, every instance of the roommate diversity problem admits a
Pareto optimal outcome. Indeed, we can start at an arbitrary outcome and perform a sequence of at
most ns Pareto improvements, i.e., rearrangements of the agents that make all agents weakly better
off and some agents strictly better off. However, it is still computationally hard to compute a Pareto
optimal outcome, as finding a Pareto improvement is difficult.
THEOREM 6.1. For the unrestricted roommate diversity problem, it is coNP-complete to decide
whether a given outcome is Pareto optimal; moreover, we cannot compute a Pareto optimal outcome
in polynomial time unless P=NP. These results hold even if preferences are dichotomous.
PROOF. To show that an outcome is not Pareto optimal, it suffices to guess a Pareto improvement
and verify that it indeed makes all agents weakly better off and some agents strictly better off; this
establishes that our decision problem is in coNP.
For both hardness results, we utilize the fact that Aziz et al. [2013] proved that deciding whether
an outcome of an anonymous game is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete and computing a Pareto
optimal outcome is NP-hard. Note that their proofs also hold for the case where agents’ preferences
are dichotomous and every agent approves at most four sizes.
To show hardness of verifying whether a given outcome is Pareto optimal, we construct a reduction
from the related problem for anonymous games. The reduction works analogously to the reduction
in the proof of Theorem 5.3. To prove the correctness of the reduction, let us assume that pi =
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{P1, . . . , Pq} is a Pareto optimal outcome of the original anonymous game. Let pi ′ = {P ′1, . . . , P ′k }
be the outcome of the corresponding roommate diversity problem where all agents are replaced
by their corresponding red agent and free spots are filled with blue agents. Then, pi ′ needs to be
Pareto optimal, as every outcome that weakly Pareto dominates pi ′ can be converted into an outcome
that weakly Pareto dominates pi by removing all blue agents and replacing all red agents by their
corresponding agent in the anonymous game. This reasoning also holds for the other direction.
Secondly, computing a Pareto optimal outcome in a roommate diversity problem is NP-hard: it
is possible to apply the reduction from Theorem 5.3 to transform every anonymous game into a
corresponding roommate diversity problem. Assuming that we have found a Pareto optimal outcome
of this roommate diversity problem, it is possible to obtain a Pareto optimal outcome of the original
anonymous game as described above. 
7 ENVY-FREENESS
We can think of envy-freeness as a “one-sided” version of exchange stability. Thus, similarly to
same-type-exchange stability, we can define same-type-envy-freeness by only considering envy
among agents of the same type. Same-type-envy-freeness is a plausible variant of envy-freeness, as
people tend to envy those who are similar to them [Salovey and Rodin, 1984]. Moreover, same-type-
envy-freeness is also an appealing notion of fairness: if agent i and agent j are of the same type and i
envies j, swapping i and j has no effect on other agents, so the decision which of these agents should
get a better set of roommates is essentially arbitrary. Unfortunately, an outcome that is fair in this
sense is not guaranteed to exist.
THEOREM 7.1. There exists an instance of the roommate diversity problem with room size two
that has no same-type-envy-free outcome and thereby also no envy-free outcome. Moreover, in this
instance the agents’ preferences are single-peaked and dichotomous.
PROOF. Let G = ({r1}, {b1,b2,b3}, 2, (%i )i ∈N ) with:
r1 :
2
2 
1
2 
0
2 ; b1,b2,b3 :
0
2 
1
2 
2
2 .
This game is clearly single-peaked and can be transformed into a dichotomous game where all agents
disapprove their two bottom fractions and approve their top-fraction. As every outcome of this game
consists of one mixed and one purely blue coalition, the blue agent in the mixed coalition always
envies the two blue agents in the pure coalition. 
On the positive side, there exist two special cases where the existence of a same-type-envy-free
outcome is guaranteed.
THEOREM 7.2. A same-type-envy-free outcome is guaranteed to exist if the number of red agents
is divisible by s or by k.
PROOF. If s divides r , there exists an outcome consisting of pure coalitions only. If k divides r ,
there exists an outcome where the fraction of each coalition is rk . In either case, all agents of the
same type are in coalitions of the same fraction, so no agent envies another agent of her type. 
Nevertheless, it can be proven by a reduction from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS that the general
existence question for envy-freeness is NP-complete.
THEOREM 7.3. It is NP-complete to decide whether a given instance of the roommate diversity
problem admits an envy-free outcome, even if no indifferences in the preference relations are allowed.
This hardness result also holds if the agents’ preferences are dichotomous and every agent is allowed
to approve at most four fractions.
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PROOF. To prove membership in NP, note that it is possible to check in polynomial time whether
an outcome is envy-free by iterating over all pairs of agents and checking whether one of them envies
the other.
In the following, we utilize the fact that the problem EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C) is NP-
complete [Garey and Johnson, 1979]. An instance of this problem is given by a set X = {1, . . . ,m}
and a collection C = {A1, . . . ,Aq} of 3-element subsets of X . It is a yes-instance if there exists a
subset C ′ ⊆ C such that C ′ is a partition of X .
To prove hardness, we construct a reduction from X3C. Let X = {1, . . . ,m} andC = {A1, . . . ,Aq}
be a collection of 3-element subsets of X . For i ∈ X , let J i = {ji1, . . . , jimi } be the set of all indices
of sets in C to which i belongs, i.e. j ∈ J i if and only if i ∈ Aj . In the following, we construct a
corresponding roommate diversity problem. The general idea of the construction is to introduce for
each element i ∈ X a corresponding agent ri such that in an envy-free outcome for all Aj ∈ C there
either exists a coalition of fraction 5j+1s including the three agents corresponding to the elements in
Aj or a coalition of fraction
5j−2
s .
Construction: To begin with, let us set s = 5q + 1 and let us introduce one red so-called set agent
ri for each i ∈ X with the following preference relation:
ri :
5ji1 + 1
s
∼ri · · · ∼ri
5jimi + 1
s
ri
1
s
ri . . . .
Moreover, for each j ∈ [q], we introduce 5j − 2 red so-called redundant agents with the following
preference relation:
r
p
j :
5j + 1
s
∼rpj
5j − 2
s
rpj
1
s
rpj . . . , ∀p ∈ [5j − 2].
Furthermore, for each j ∈ [q], we insert s − (5j + 1) blue so-called filling agents with the following
preference relation:
b
p
j :
5j + 1
s
∼bpj
5j − 2
s
bpj 0 bpj . . . , ∀p ∈ [s − (5j + 1)].
Additionally, for each j ∈ [q], we introduce three blue so-called additional agents b˜1j , b˜2j , b˜3j with the
following preference relation:
b˜1j , b˜
2
j , b˜
3
j :
5j − 2
s
 0  . . . .
We further insert blue agents strictly preferring 0 to all other fractions until the total number of agents
is divisible by s. Lastly, for each red agent of the game, we introduce s blue agents strictly preferring
0 to all other fractions.
Correctness: (⇒)We start by assuming that there exists a partition pi ⊆ C of X . In the following,
using pi , we construct an envy-free outcome pi ′ of the roommate diversity problem. Therefore,
for each Aj ∈ pi , we add one coalition Pj consisting of the corresponding three red set agents,
the 5j − 2 designated red redundant agents and the s − (5j + 1) designated blue filling agents:
Pj = {ri : i ∈ Aj } ∪ {rpj : p ∈ [5j − 2]} ∪ {bpj : p ∈ [s − (5j + 1)]}. Moreover, for each Aj < pi ,
we create a coalition Pj consisting of the designated 5j − 2 red redundant agents together with
the designated s − (5j + 1) blue filling agents and the designated three additional blue agents:
Pj = {b˜1j , b˜2j , b˜3j } ∪ {rpj : p ∈ [5j − 2]} ∪ {bpj : p ∈ [s − (5j + 1)]}. Finally, we put the remaining blue
agents into purely blue coalitions. pi ′ consists of purely blue coalitions and q mixed coalitions of
fraction 5j+1s or
5j−2
s for j ∈ [q].
We prove that pi ′ is envy-free by iterating over all agents and showing that they do not envy another
agent: as pi is a partition, all red set agents are in one of their most preferred coalitions. Moreover, by
construction, all redundant agents and all filling agents are in one of their most preferred coalitions.
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Concerning the additional agents, for all j ∈ [q] such thatAj < pi , b˜1j , b˜2j , b˜3j are in their top coalition.
For all j ∈ [q] such that Aj ∈ pi , b˜1j , b˜2j , b˜3j are in a purely blue coalition. However, as Aj ∈ pi , there
does not exist a coalition of fraction 5j−2s . As there also does not exist a coalition within distance
1
s
to this fraction, b˜1j , b˜
2
j and b˜
3
j do not envy another agent for all j ∈ [q].
As all blue agents strictly preferring a purely blue coalition to all other coalitions are in a pure
coalition, no agent envies another agent in pi ′.
(⇐) Let us assume that there exists an envy-free outcome pi of the constructed roommate diversity
problem. In the following, we prove that this implies that there exists a partition pi ′ ⊆ C of X . First
of all, note that due to the introduction of s blue agents for each red agent, every outcome of the
game includes at least one purely blue coalition P ∈ pi .
Using this, we prove that each red agent is part of one of her most preferred coalitions. For the
sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a red agent p for which this is not the case. Then,
it either holds that p is in a coalition of fraction 1s or in a coalition of a fraction to which she prefers
1
s . In the former case, all blue agents in i’s coalition envy the agents in P , as all blue agents prefer 0
to 1s . In the latter case, p envies the agents in P . Consequently, every red agent is in one of her most
preferred coalitions.
From this it follows that every coalition of fraction 5j+1s for some j ∈ [q] includes at most 5j − 2
red redundant agents and thereby exactly three set agents ri with i ∈ Aj . By removing all non-set
agents from pi , it is possible to obtain a partition pi ′ ⊆ C of X .
Note that the reduction still holds if no indifferences in the agents’ preferences are allowed. It is
possible to replace the indifferences in the agents’ preference relations by strict preferences in an
arbitrary way without influencing the validity of the proof. The second part of the proof remains
unaffected, while the outcome pi ′ constructed in the first part is still envy-free, as for all j ∈ [q]
only either a coalition of fraction 5j−2s or of fraction
5j+1
s exists and for all j, j
′ ∈ [q] it holds that
| 5j+1s − 5j
′−2
s | > 1s .
Note further that it is also possible to transform every X3C instance into a corresponding dichoto-
mous roommate diversity problem. To do so, the construction given above needs to be only slightly
adapted: for all agents, their set of approved fractions consists of all explicitly listed fractions. 
We were not able to extend Theorem 7.3 to same-type-envy-freeness, but conjecture that the
hardness result still holds. If preferences are strict, there exists a simple algorithm that solves this
problem in time linear in n and single-exponential in s, i.e., this problem is in FPT with respect to s.
THEOREM 7.4. Given an instance of the roommate diversity problem with room size s and strict
preferences, it is possible to check in time O(ns2s ) whether this instance admits a same-type-envy-free
outcome and to find one if it exists.
PROOF. Let pi = {C1, . . . ,Ck } be a same-type-envy-free outcome. Then, for every agent i there
does not exist a coalition C ∈ pi such that i strictly prefers θ (C) to the fraction of her own coalition
θ (pi (i)).
This observation gives rise to the following algorithm. First, we guess a subset X ⊆ { `s : ` ∈ [0, s]}
of precisely the fractions that occur in one same-type-envy-free outcome of the game. Then, for each
`
s ∈ X , we determine the set S` of all agents for whom `s is the most preferred element of X . If for
each `s ∈ X , the set S` includes t · ` red agents and t · (s − `) blue agents for some positive integer
t , we create t rooms of fraction `s consisting of exactly the agents from S`; if for some fraction
in X this is not the case, we reject the current guess of X . If all guesses are rejected, there is no
same-type-envy-free outcome. 
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8 PARAMETERIZED ANALYSIS
In Section 3, we saw that fixing the size of the rooms to s = 2 has a significant impact on the
complexity of finding stable outcomes. Motivated by this result, as well as by Theorem 7.4, in this
section, we study the parameterized complexity of the roommate diversity problem with respect to
parameter s. This is a promising parameter, since in most of our hardness reductions we converted
an anonymous hedonic game with n agents into an instance with room size n; it is also appealing
because in practice the room size can be much smaller than the number of agents. Indeed, most of
the algorithmic problems considered in this work turn out to be in FPT with respect to s. We start by
considering (strong) core stability.
THEOREM 8.1. The problem of determining whether an instance of the roommate diversity
problem admits a (strongly) core stable outcome is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the
room size.
PROOF. Throughout the proof, we focus on finding core stable outcomes; in the end, we will
comment on how to modify the proof for strong core stability.
As every agent is fully characterized by her preference relation and type, both the number of
different red agents tr and the number of different blue agents tb can be upper-bounded by 2(s+1)
2
.
Let %R1 , ...,%Rtr (respectively, %
B
1 , ...,%Btb ) be an enumeration of all possible preference relations
of red (respectively, blue) agents. Then, an instance of our problem can be fully described by a
(tr +tb )-tuple (r1, ..., rtr ,b1, ...,btb ), where ri (resp., bi ) denotes the number of red (resp., blue) agents
with preference relation %Ri (resp., %Bi ).
Now, we need a concise encoding of outcomes that enables us to check whether a given outcome
is core stable. For a given outcome, let ri, j (resp., bi, j ) denote the number of red (resp., blue) agents
with preference relation %Ri (resp., %Bi ) in rooms with j red agents. Moreover, given ri, j and bi, j , let
qR (j) (resp., qB (j)) denote the number of red (resp., blue) agents who strictly prefer a room with j red
agents to their current room:
qR (j) =
∑
`∈[s]
∑
i ∈[tr ]:
j
s Ri `s
ri, `, q
B (j) =
∑
`∈[0,s−1]
∑
i ∈[tb ]:
j
s Bi `s
bi, ` .
The values of these variables determine whether an outcome is core stable: for example, there exists
a blocking coalition with three red agents if and only if qR (3) ≥ 3 and qB (3) ≥ s − 3.
Hence, to decide whether an instance G = (r1, ..., rtr ,b1, ...,btb ) admits a core stable outcome, it
is sufficient to check whether there exists an assignment to the variables ri, j and bi, j inducing an
outcome for which no blocking coalition exists. We formalize this problem as an Integer Linear
Program (ILP) and use the fact that it is possible to solve an ILP with ρ variables and input length
L in time O(ρ2.5ρ+o(ρ)L) [Kannan, 1987, Lenstra Jr, 1983]. To build the ILP, for each j ∈ [0, s],
we define an additional variable nj denoting the number of rooms with j red agents. The intuition
detailed above results in the following collection of constraints:∑
j ∈[s]
ri, j = ri ,∀i ∈ [tR ]
∑
j ∈[0,s−1]
bi, j = bi ,∀i ∈ [tB ] (1)
∑
i ∈[tR ]
ri, j = jnj ,∀j ∈ [s]
∑
i ∈[tB ]
bi, j = (s − j)nj ,∀j ∈ [0, s − 1] (2)
qR (j) < j ∨ qB (j) < (s − j), ∀j ∈ [0, s] (3)
bi, j , ri′, j ,nj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [0, s],∀i ∈ [tB ],∀i ′ ∈ [tR ] (4)
15
First, constraints (1) ensure that every agent is assigned to some coalition. Second, constraints (2)
ensure that the values of ri, j and bi, j induce a valid outcome, i.e., it is possible to put all agents into
rooms of fraction specified by the variables ri, j and bi, j . Constraints (3) ensure that the induced
outcome pi is core stable by enforcing that there is no blocking coalition of size s with j red and
s − j blue agents, for all j ∈ [0, s]; these constraints are non-linear but can be converted to linear
constraints by introducing one extra variable per constraint [Bradley et al., 1977, Chapter 9].
The resulting ILP has O(s2s2 ) variables and has a feasible solution if and only if the underlying
roommate diversity problem admits a core stable outcome. Now, applying the algorithm of Lenstra Jr
[1983] and Kannan [1987], we can determine whether a roommate diversity problem admits a core
stable outcome in time f (s)O(n) for some computable function f (s).
By modifying the definitions of qR (j),qB (j) and constraints (3) appropriately, we can adapt the
ILP to check whether a roommate diversity problem admits a strongly core stable outcome. 
This approach, with appropriate modifications, extends to (strong) exchange stability and envy-
freeness.
THEOREM 8.2. The problem of determining whether an instance of the roommate diversity
problem admits a (strongly) exchange stable outcome is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the
room size.
PROOF. To construct an algorithm for this problem, we build upon the ideas and notation from
Theorem 8.1. However, it is not possible to directly apply the reasoning from the previous theorem
to this situation, as here it is necessary to bookmark the fraction of the agents’ current coalition as
well. Therefore, let cR (j,k) (resp., cB (j,k)) denote the number of red (resp., blue) agents being in a
coalition with j red agents and preferring a coalition with k red agents:
cR (j,k) =
∑
i ∈[tr ]:
k
s Ri js
ri, j , c
B (j,k) =
∑
i ∈[tb ]:
k
s Bi js
bi, j .
To begin with, we only consider different-type swaps. To ensure that an outcome is different-
type-exchange stable, it is sufficient to check that there does not exist a red agent r ∗ ∈ R and a
blue agent b∗ ∈ B in different coalitions satisfying the following property: there exists a j ∈ [s]
and k ∈ [s] such that r ∗ is in a coalition with j red agents and prefers a coalition with k red agents,
and b∗ is in a coalition with k − 1 red agents and prefers a coalition with j − 1 red agents. If two
such agents exist, they always have a different-type-exchange-deviation. In the case that j , k − 1,
two agents satisfying the specified property are always in different coalitions. Consequently, every
different-type-exchange stable outcome has to satisfy cR (j,k) = 0 ∨ cB (k − 1, j − 1) = 0 for all
j,k ∈ [s] : j , k − 1. In contrast to this, in the case that j = k − 1, it might be possible to put all
agents satisfying the specified property in the same coalition. However, if this is not possible, the
outcome becomes immediately unstable. Therefore, every different-type-exchange stable outcome
has to additionally satisfy cR (j, j + 1) = 0 ∨ cB (j, j − 1) = 0 ∨ (cR (j, j + 1) ≤ j ∧ cB (j, j − 1) ≤ s − j)
for all j ∈ [s − 1].
On the other hand, to ensure that pi is same-type-exchange stable, it is sufficient to check that for
no k , j ∈ [0, s] do there exist two agents of the same type such that one of them is in a coalition
with j red agents and prefers a coalition with k red agents, and the other is in a coalition with k
red agents and prefers a coalition with j red agents. Note that if two such agents exist they are in
different coalitions and thereby always have an exchange-deviation. Consequently, every same-type
exchange stable outcome has to satisfy cR (j,k) = 0 ∨ cR (k, j) = 0 for all j,k ∈ [s] : j < k and
cB (j,k) = 0 ∨ cB (k, j) = 0 for all j,k ∈ [0, s − 1] : j < k.
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Putting all these ideas together results in the following collection of constraints:∑
j ∈[0,s−1]
bi, j = bi ,∀i ∈ [tB ];
∑
j ∈[s]
ri, j = ri ,∀i ∈ [tR ] (1)∑
i ∈[tB ]
bi, j = (s − j)nj ,∀j ∈ [0, s − 1];
∑
i ∈[tR ]
ri, j = jnj ,∀j ∈ [s] (2)
cR (j,k) = 0 ∨ cB (k − 1, j − 1) = 0, ∀j,k ∈ [s] : j , k − 1 (3.a)
cR (j, j + 1) = 0 ∨ cB (j, j − 1) = 0 ∨
(cR (j, j + 1) ≤ j ∧ cB (j, j − 1) ≤ s − j), ∀j ∈ [s − 1]. (3.b)
cR (j,k) ≤ 0 ∨ cR (k, j) ≤ 0, ∀j,k ∈ [s] : j < k (4)
cB (j,k) ≤ 0 ∨ cB (k, j) ≤ 0, ∀j,k ∈ [0, s − 1] : j < k (5)
bi, j , ri′, j ,nj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [0, s],∀i ∈ [tB ],∀i ′ ∈ [tR ] (6)
As in the proof of Theorem 8.1, the first two constraints ensure that ri, j and bi, j induce a valid
outcome pi , while constraints (3.a) and (3.b) ensure that no pair of agents with a different-type-
exchange-deviation exists. Moreover, constraints (4) and (5) ensure that no pair of agents with a
same-type-exchange-deviation exists. Again, it is possible to apply the ideas of Bradley et al. [1977,
Chapter 9] to obtain an ILP in standard form where the number of used variables lies in O(s2s2 ).
Therefore, by applying the algorithm from Lenstra Jr [1983] and Kannan [1987], it is possible to
determine whether a roommate diversity problem admits an exchange stable outcome in f (s)O(n)
for some computable function f (s).
It is also possible to adapt the definitions of cR (j,k), cB (j,k) and constraints (3)-(5) slightly to
check whether a strongly exchange stable outcome exists. 
THEOREM 8.3. The problem of determining whether an instance of the roommate diversity
problem admits an envy-free outcome is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the room size.
PROOF. First of all, recall that envy-freeness can be interpreted as a one-sided version of exchange
stability where only one agent needs to be willing to swap with the other. Therefore, we only need to
slightly adapt the proof of Theorem 8.2 to show the theorem. Again, we use the notation introduced
in the previous two proofs. We only discuss the constraints that red agents need to fulfill in an
envy-free outcome. The constraints for blue agents follow analogously.
We start by considering same-type-envy. In a same-type-envy-free outcome, for no j,k ∈ [1, s],
there exists a red agent r ∗ who is in a coalition with j red agents and prefers an existing coalition with
k red agents, i.e. ks r ∗ js . This would immediately imply that r ∗ envies another red agent in one of
the coalitions with k agents. Thereby, it needs to hold that cR (j,k) = 0 ∨ nk = 0 for all j,k ∈ [s].
In a different-type-envy-free outcome, for no red agent r ∗ in a coalition with j red agents who
prefers a coalition with k agents, a different coalition with k − 1 red agents is allowed to exist. In the
case where j , k − 1, if one coalition with k − 1 exists, r ∗ cannot be part of this coalition, as r ∗ is part
of a coalition with j red agents. Thereby, if there exists at least on coalition with k − 1 red agents, r ∗
always envies at least one blue agent in such a coalition in this case. However, if j = k − 1 and nj = 1,
r ∗ is in the only coalition with k − 1 red agents and thereby there exists no blue agent in a different
coalition with k − 1 red agents who r ∗ could envy. These conditions can be enforced by the following
two constraints: cR (j,k) = 0 ∨ nk−1 = 0 for all j,k ∈ [s] : j , k − 1 and cR (j, j + 1) = 0 ∨ nj ≤ 1 for
all j ∈ [s − 1].
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These considerations result in the following collection of constraints:∑
j ∈[0,s−1]
bi, j = bi ,∀i ∈ [tB ];
∑
j ∈[s]
ri, j = ri ,∀i ∈ [tR ] (1)∑
i ∈[tB ]
bi, j = (s − j)nj ,∀j ∈ [0, s − 1];
∑
i ∈[tR ]
ri, j = jnj ,∀j ∈ [s] (2)
cR (j,k) = 0 ∨ nk = 0, ∀j,k ∈ [s] (3)
cR (j,k) = 0 ∨ nk−1 = 0, ∀j,k ∈ [s] : j , k − 1 (4.a)
cR (j, j + 1) = 0 ∨ nj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [s − 1] (4.b)
cB (j,k) = 0 ∨ nk = 0, ∀j,k ∈ [0, s − 1] (5)
cB (j,k) = 0 ∨ nk+1 = 0, ∀j,k ∈ [0, s − 1] : j , k + 1 (6.a)
cB (j, j − 1) = 0 ∨ nj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [s − 1] (6.b)
bi, j , ri′, j ,nj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [0, s],∀i ∈ [tB ],∀i ′ ∈ [tR ] (7)
As in the proof of Theorem 8.1, the first two constraints ensure that ri, j and bi, j induce a valid
outcome pi , while constraint (3) ensures that no red agent envies another red agent. Moreover,
constraints (4.a) and (4.b) ensure that no red agent envies a blue agent. Respectively, constraints
(5), (6.a) and (6.b) ensure that no blue agent envies another blue agent or a red agent. Again, it is
possible to apply the ideas of Bradley et al. [1977, Chapter 9] to obtain an ILP in standard form where
the number of used variables lies in O(s2s2 ). Therefore, by applying the algorithm from Lenstra Jr
[1983] and Kannan [1987], it is possible to determine whether a roommate diversity problem admits
an envy-free outcome in f (s)O(n) for some computable function f (s). 
Theorems 8.1–8.3 highlight a fundamental difference between the classical stable roommate
problem and the roommate problem with diversity preferences: for the former all studied existence
problems are NP-complete for s = 3 or even for s = 2, while for the latter many of these problems
are polynomial-time solvable if the size of the rooms is fixed or bounded. Thus, assuming diversity
preferences fundamentally changes the complexity of the roommate problem. We note, however, that
we were unable to extend our ILP techniques to questions concerning Pareto optimality; it remains
an open problem whether these questions are also in FPT with respect to the room size s.
9 EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
One can generalize the roommate diversity problem, as defined in this paper, in several ways. This
section proposes three independent extensions; exploring them in detail is left for future work.
More than two types Boehmer and Elkind [2020] generalized hedonic diversity games to allow for
more than two types. They proposed two different approaches. Under the first approach, agents are
allowed to express their preferences over every possible combination of fractions of agents of all
other types in their coalition: for example, assuming that red, blue and green agents are present, an
agent is allowed to assess a coalition based on the fraction of red agents, the fraction of blue agents
and the fraction of green agents in the coalition. Under the second approach, each agent only cares
about the fraction of agents of her own type in her coalition: e.g., a red agent is indifferent between
a coalition with 2 red agents and 2 blue agents and a coalition with 2 red agents, 1 blue agent and
1 green agent. We can apply both of these approaches in our setting. Notably, the first approach
results in a formalism that subsumes the multidimensional stable roommate problem with general
preferences, as it is possible to create a designated type for each agent. Consequently, all negative
results for the stable roommate problem hold for this model. However, the hardness results require
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an unbounded number of types. In fact, all existence questions considered in this paper still lie in
FPT with respect to the size of the rooms plus the number of types: we can introduce a variable for
the number of agents of a given type with a given preference relation that are placed in a room with a
given distribution of types and adjust the constraints in the ILPs accordingly.
Free spots In our model, we assume that agents fit exactly into the available rooms. In practice, this
is not always the case. We can extend our model by adding a parameter k specifying the number of
rooms, so that ks ≥ |N |. Since it is no longer guaranteed that each room has exactly s agents, the
domain of the agents’ preferences needs to be extended accordingly: D = { jt : t ∈ [s], j ∈ [0, t]}.
In this model, we can consider modifications of traditional hedonic game stability notions, such
as Nash stability, individual stability and core stability, where agents (groups) are only allowed to
deviate into free spots; this approach has been explored by Aziz [2013] for the classic roommate
setting. In fact, this model is expressive enough to represent every hedonic diversity game: it suffices
to set s = k = n. Thus, all negative results for hedonic diversity games such as the hardness of
determining whether a game admits a Nash or core stable outcome [Boehmer and Elkind, 2020,
Bredereck et al., 2019] also hold in this model.
Non-uniform room sizes Another natural extension is to relax the uniformity condition imposed
on the size of the rooms and allow rooms of different sizes. For instance, in our wedding reception
example, different tables may have different sizes. To capture this, we replace the constant s in our
model by a tuple (s1, ...., sk ), where si denotes the size of the i-th room; we require ∑ki=1 si = |N |.
Again, it is necessary to adjust the domain of the agents’ preferences: D = { jsi : i ∈ [k], j ∈ [0, si ]}.
Then, all existence problems considered in Section 8 can be shown to be fixed-parameter tractable
with respect to maxi ∈[k] si , by a simple modification of the respective ILPs.
10 MARRIAGE PROBLEM WITH DIVERSITY PREFERENCES
Recall that in the stable marriage problem, we have n men and n women, who have preferences over
the members of the opposite sex, and the goal is to split them into n pairs, with each pair consisting
of one man and one woman, so that the resulting assignment is core stable; one can also consider
other notions of fairness and stability in this context, such as exchange stability or Pareto optimality.
Knuth [1976] generalized this model to higher dimensions, where the agents belong to s ≥ 2
categories (say, freshmen, sophomores, juniors and seniors), and the goal is to form groups of size
s, with one representative from each category. Here, preferences are either defined over (s − 1)-
tuples of agents or induced by preferences over each category. For preferences defined over tuples,
Ng and Hirschberg [1991] and, independently, Subramanian [1994] proved NP-completeness of
determining whether a game admits a core stable outcome; for the setting where preferences are
defined over individual agents and then lifted to tuples, Huang [2007] proved NP-completeness of
several stability-related questions.
In this section, we consider a variant of this problem with diversity preferences: we assume that
each agent belongs to one of s categories and also to one of two types (say, red and blue) . The goal is
to form groups that have one representative from each category, with agents’ preferences over groups
being determined by the fraction of red agents in each group. For instance, a project team may have
to include one student from each year of study (i.e., a freshman, a sophomore, a junior and a senior),
but the students’ preferences over teams are driven by the gender distribution in each team (assuming
for simplicity that each student identifies as male or female). We formalize this setting as follows.
Definition 10.1. An s-dimensional marriage diversity problem is a quadruple G = ({N1, ...,Ns },
R,B, (%i )i ∈N1∪···∪Ns ) with N =
⋃· i ∈[s] Ni , N = R∪· B, and |N | = k ·s for some k ∈ N. The preference
relation %i of each agent i ∈ N is a weak order over the set D = { js : j ∈ [0, s]}.
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An outcome of a marriage diversity problem is a partition pi = {C1, ...,Ck } of all agents into k
different coalitions of size s such that |Ci ∩ Nj | = 1 for all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [s]. In what follows, we refer
to Ni as the i-th dimension of the problem and say that two agents a,b ∈ N lie in the same dimension
if a,b ∈ Ni for some i ∈ [s]. The definitions of stability concepts for this setting can be obtained by
modifying the respective definitions for the roommate diversity problem: for exchange stability, we
only allow swaps between agents that lie in the same dimension, and for core stability, we only allow
deviations by coalitions that contain exactly one agent from each dimension.
Interestingly, in contrast to the roommate diversity problem, the marriage diversity problem may
fail to have an exchange stable outcome even for s = 2.
THEOREM 10.2. An instance of the marriage diversity problem may fail to have an exchange
stable outcome, even if s = 2 and agents’ preferences are dichotomous and single-peaked.
PROOF. Consider an instance of the marriage diversity problem with R = {r1, r2}, B = {b1,b2},
s = 2, N1 = {r1,b1}, N2 = {r2,b2} and the following preferences:
r1 :
2
2 
1
2 
0
2 , r2 :
1
2 
2
2 
0
2 , b1 :
0
2 
1
2 
2
2 , b2 :
1
2 
0
2 
2
2 .
This instance has two possible outcomes: pi = {{r1, r2}, {b1,b2}} and pi ′ = {{r1,b2}, {b1, r2}}. In pi ,
agents r2 and b2 have an exchange deviation, and in pi ′, agents r1 and b1 have an exchange deviation.
This example also shows that an envy-free outcome is not guaranteed to exist. 
While the marriage diversity problem is more structured than the roommate diversity problem, the
two problems are strongly related: we can adapt the reductions from Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 5.3 to
prove that hardness results for core and strong exchange stability still hold for the marriage diversity
problem.
THEOREM 10.3. It is NP-complete to decide whether a given instance of the marriage diversity
problem admits a core stable outcome or a strongly exchange stable outcome.
PROOF. To begin with, we prove the theorem for core stability by constructing a reduction from
the related problem for anonymous games:
Construction: Let G = (N , (i )i ∈N ) be an anonymous game. We construct a corresponding
|N |-dimensional marriage diversity problem. For each i ∈ N , we create a new dimension containing
one red agent ri whose preference relation is defined by:
j
s
%ri
j ′
s
iff j %i j ′,∀j, j ′ ∈ [s]
and, for each ` ∈ [s], s2 blue agents:
b j
`
: `
s
b j
`
0,∀j ∈ [s2].
The proof of correctness of this reduction is completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Next, we prove hardness for strong exchange stability by constructing a reduction from the problem
of deciding whether an anonymous game admits a Nash stable outcome:
Construction: Let G = (N , (i )i ∈N ) be an anonymous game. From G, we create an |N |-
dimensional marriage diversity problem. For each i ∈ N , we create a new dimension containing a
red agent ri whose preference relation is defined by:
j
s
%ri
j ′
s
iff j %i j ′,∀j, j ′ ∈ [s]
and n − 1 blue agents who are indifferent among all coalitions.
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Correctness: (⇒) Let pi = {P1, . . . , Pq} be a Nash stable outcome of the anonymous game.
From pi , we construct a strongly exchange stable outcome of the corresponding marriage diversity
problem. For all j ∈ [q], we insert one coalition P ′j consisting of all red agents corresponding to the
agents in Pj and s − |Pj | blue agents from the remaining dimensions into pi ′. The remaining blue
agents are put into valid pure coalitions of size s.
pi ′ is strongly exchange stable, as no pair of red agents is allowed to swap, as they are all from
different dimensions. Furthermore, no red agent has an incentive to swap with a blue agent, as this
would correspond to an individual deviation of the corresponding agent in the anonymous game
which cannot be rational, since pi is Nash stable.
(⇐) Let pi = {P1, . . . , P`, . . . , Pk } be a strongly exchange stable outcome of the marriage diversity
problem where w.l.o.g. the first ` coalitions contain red agents, while the remaining coalitions are
purely blue coalitions. Let pi ′ = {P ′1, . . . , P
′
`
} with P ′j = {i : ri ∈ Pj } for all j ∈ [`] be an outcome
of the anonymous game. To prove that pi ′ is Nash stable, note that for all red agents there always
exists exactly one blue agent from her dimension in every other coalition. As pi is strongly exchange
stable, from this and the fact that each blue agent is indifferent among all coalitions it follows that
for all i ∈ [n] it holds that:
θ (pi (ri )) %ri
1
s
and ∀j ∈ [`] \ {pi (ri )} : θ (pi (ri )) %ri
|P ′j | + 1
s
.
By construction, from this it follows that for all i ∈ [n] it holds that:
θ (pi ′(i)) %i 1 and ∀j ∈ [`] \ {pi ′(i)} : θ (pi ′(i)) %i |P ′j | + 1,
which implies that pi ′ is Nash stable. 
Also, just as for the roommate problem, we can transform the single-peaked anonymous hedonic
game with empty core constructed by Banerjee et al. [2001] into an instance of the marriage diversity
problem with no core stable outcome.
COROLLARY 10.4. A marriage diversity problem may fail to admit a core stable outcome, even if
preferences are strict and single-peaked.
On the positive side, we can apply our ILP approach to the marriage diversity problem to show
that the problem of finding a (strongly) core stable or a (strongly) exchange stable outcome is
fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of dimensions.
THEOREM 10.5. The problem of deciding whether a marriage diversity problem admits a
(strongly) core stable or a (strongly) exchange stable outcome is in FPT with respect to the number
of dimensions s.
PROOF. To begin with, we adapt the ILP from Theorem 8.1 to prove the theorem for core stability.
Here, apart from bookmarking the type and preference relation of every agent, it is also necessary to
bookmark her dimension. Therefore, given a marriage diversity problem, let r `i (resp., b
`
i ) be the
number of red (resp., blue) agents with preference relation %Ri (resp., %Bi ) which are part of the `-th
dimension and r `i, j (resp., b
`
i, j ) the number of such agents in a room with j red agents.
A blocking coalition containing j red agents exists in an outcome pi if there exist j dimensions
where at least one red agent prefers such a coalition to her current coalition and a disjoint set of s − j
dimensions where at least one blue agent prefers such a coalition to her current coalition. To check
this, for each j ∈ [s], let дj denote the number of dimensions where at least one red agent prefers a
coalition of j red agents to her current coalition and at least one blue agent a coalition of j red agents
to her current coalition. Moreover, let дRj denote the number of dimensions where at least one red
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agent prefers a coalition of j red agents to her current coalition and no blue agent prefers a coalition
of j red agents to her current coalition. We define дBj analogously. Utilizing these variables, it is
possible to ensure that no blocking coalition exists by enforcing that for each j the gap between j
and дRj plus the gap between s − j and дBj is less than дj . This idea results in the following collection
of adapted constraints:∑
j ∈[s]
r `i, j = r
`
i ,∀i ∈ [tR ]
∑
j ∈[0,s−1]
b`i, j = b
`
i ,∀i ∈ [tB ] (1)
∑
i ∈[tR ]
`∈[s]
r `i, j = jnj ,∀j ∈ [s]
∑
i ∈[tB ]
`∈[s]
b`i, j = (s − j)nj ,∀j ∈ [0, s − 1] (2.a)
∑
i ∈[tR ]
r `i, j +
∑
i ∈[tB ]
b`i, j = nj , ∀j ∈ [0, s],∀` ∈ [s] (2.b)
max(0, j − дRj )+
max(0, (n − j) − дBj ) < дj , ∀j ∈ [0, s] (3)
b`i, j , r
`
i′, j ,nj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [0, s],∀i ∈ [tB ],∀i ′ ∈ [tR ],∀` ∈ [s] (5)
First, constraints (1) ensure that every agent in the game is assigned to some room. Second,
constraints (2.a) and (2.b) ensure that the values of r `i, j and b
`
i, j induce a valid outcome of the game:
constraints (2.a) ensure that it is possible to put all agents into rooms of fraction specified in the
variables r `i, j and b
`
i, j , while constraints (2.b) ensure that it is possible to construct such an outcome
where all agents in a coalition come from different dimension. As explained above, constraints (3)
ensure that no blocking coalition exists. Following again the ideas of Bradley et al. [1977, Chapter 9],
it is possible to convert this into an ILP in standard form formulated in terms of O(s2s2 ) variables.
Applying the algorithm from Lenstra Jr [1983] and Kannan [1987], it is possible to determine whether
a marriage diversity problem admits a core stable outcome in f (s)O(n) for some computable function
f (s).
Turning to exchange stability, it is again possible to start from the related Theorem 8.2 for the
roommate diversity problem. However, in this case, for two agents to have an exchange-deviation,
they need to come from the same dimension. Therefore, let cR
`
(j,k) (resp., cB
`
(j,k)) be the number
of red (resp., blue) agents from dimension ` being in a coalition with j red agents and preferring
a coalition with k red agents. Here, in contrast to the roommate setting, we do not need to check
whether two agents which may have a exchange-deviation come from two different coalitions, as
this constraint is already implied by the fact that the two agents need to be from the same dimension.
Thereby, adapting the ILP from Theorem 8.2 results in the following collection of constraints:∑
j ∈[0,s−1]
b`i, j = b
`
i ,∀i ∈ [tB ]
∑
j ∈[s]
r `i, j = r
`
i ,∀i ∈ [tR ] (1)∑
i ∈[tB ]
`∈[s]
b`i, j = (s − j)nj ,∀j ∈ [0, s − 1]
∑
i ∈[tR ]
`∈[s]
r `i, j = jnj ,∀j ∈ [s] (2.a)
∑
i ∈[tR ]
r `i, j +
∑
i ∈[tB ]
b`i, j = nj , ∀j ∈ [0, s],∀` ∈ [s] (2.b)
cR` (j,k) = 0 ∨ cB` (k − 1, j − 1) = 0, ∀j,k, ` ∈ [s] (3)
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cR` (j,k) = 0 ∨ cR` (k, j) = 0, ∀j,k, ` ∈ [s] : j < k (4)
cB` (j,k) = 0 ∨ cB` (k, j) = 0, ∀` ∈ [s],∀j,k ∈ [0, s − 1] : j < k (5)
bi, j , ri′, j ,nj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [0, s],∀i ∈ [tB ],∀i ′ ∈ [tR ] (5)
Here, as before, constraints (1), (2.a) and (2.b) ensure that r `i, j and b
`
i, j induce a valid outcome.
Moreover, constraints (3) ensure that no two agents have a different-type-exchange-deviation. In
addition, constraints (4) ensure that no two red agents have a same-type-exchange-deviation, while
constraints (5) do the same for blue agents. It is again possible to convert this to an ILP in standard
form following the ideas of Bradley et al. [1977, Chapter 9] and to apply the algorithm from Lenstra Jr
[1983] and Kannan [1987] to determine whether a marriage diversity problem admits an exchange
stable outcome in f (s)O(n) for some computable function f (s). 
11 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we have proposed the roommate diversity problem, which is an interesting special
case of the multidimensional stable roommate problem. We have initiated the algorithmic study
of this problem by considering various standard solution concepts and analyzing the existence of
stable outcomes and the complexity of computing them (see Table 1). While we have answered
many questions that arise in this context, the complexity of deciding whether a roommate diversity
problem admits an exchange stable outcome remains open. Moreover, it is unclear if every instance
with dichotomous preferences admits an exchange stable outcome.
By parameterizing our computational problems by the size of the rooms, we showed that diversity
preferences are a powerful restriction, as all studied existence problems lie in FPT with respect to this
parameter. However, it would be desirable to obtain parameterized algorithms that are combinatorial
rather than ILP-based, since ILP-based algorithms tend to be slow in practice.
Finally, we believe that both the marriage diversity problem and the three extensions of our model
introduced in Section 9 deserve further attention.
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